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I. INTRODUCTION
I would like to thank Professor Barker for the invitation to
speak at this seminar on Separation of Powers in the Americas
and Beyond. Today, I will be describing the extent to which the
Canadian model of governance reflects the separation of powers
doctrine. We tend to associate this principle with the writings of
18th century French political philosopher Baron de Montesquieu.
Firmly committed to the rule of law, Montesquieu believed that
the division of the state's powers into distinct spheres of legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial authority would prevent tyranny.' He
* Chief Justice, Federal Court of Appeal, Canada. I wish to acknowledge the thor-
ough research assistance of my current and former law clerks, Livia Aumand and Manon
Lavoie, in the preparation of this paper.
1. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 11.4 (Thomas Nugent trans.,
MacMillan Press 1949) (1748).
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advocated that allowing each branch to check the powers of the
other two branches would ensure compliance with the rule of law.
Therefore, no individual branch of government could threaten the
freedom of the people.
While Montesquieu's model represents one method of avoiding
absolute rule, modern experience has demonstrated that rigid ap-
plication of the separation of powers doctrine is not the only man-
ner of achieving a democratic society. This is so not only in Can-
ada, but in other young nations as well. For example, New Zea-
land and Belize do not employ a strict separation of powers.
Although a strict application of Montesquieu's teachings is not
representative of the Canadian experience, the rule of law is foun-
dational in Canadian society, as noted in the preamble to the Ca-
nadian Constitution.2 Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Can-
ada has identified "constitutionalism and the rule of law" to be an
underlying principle of the Canadian Constitution.
3
Canada recognizes its commitments to the rule of law and indi-
vidual liberty through the checks and balances found in the text
and unwritten principles of the Canadian Constitution. As the
guardians of the Constitution, the courts have an essential role in
ensuring that the legislative and executive branches of govern-
ment abide by it. 4 In their role as arbiters of adjudicative dis-
putes, and when asked by the government to give advisory opin-
ions, the courts may rule on the constitutional validity of legisla-
tion or executive action. 5 The courts are also constitutionally em-
powered to review both the procedural and the substantive out-
comes of administrative action to ensure that the various arms of
the executive operate in accordance with the powers delegated to
them.6
In this paper, I explore the role of the Constitution and the
courts in ensuring that the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches are committed to a democratic society governed by the
rule of law. To gain an understanding of the relationship between
the three branches of the Canadian government, it is useful to ex-
2. "Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God
and the rule of law[.]" Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982
ch. 11 (Can.).
3. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 1 70 (Can.); see also Roncarelli
v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121 142 (Can.); Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R.
721 63-64 (Can.).
4. Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] S.C.R. 47 (Can.).
5. Schedule B Constitution Act, 1982, §§ 24 & 52(1) (Can.).
6. New Brunswick (Bd. ofMgmt.) v. Dunsmuir, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (Can.).
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amine the way in which the historical context surrounding Can-
ada's formation influenced its governmental structure.
7
II. CANADA'S PRE- CONFEDERATION HISTORY
Last year marked the 400th anniversary of the founding of
Quebec City by French explorer Samuel de Champlain in 1608.
Although aboriginal peoples had lived for many hundreds of years
on this land, the establishment of Quebec City, one of North
America's first European settlements, ushered in a new era that
ultimately led to Canada's formation in 1867.
At the outset of the French regime, democratic institutions as
we know them today did not exist in the colony. In fact, the
French inhabitants of New France were never represented in leg-
islative assemblies. Mirroring the system in France, affairs in the
colonies were run on feudal principles, and the colonized territory
remained under the rule of an absolute monarch until the populist
revolution of the late 1700s.8 Indeed, after 1662, a royal govern-
ment ruled the colony from France by way of a governor, whose
main role was leader of the French militia. An intendant also as-
sisted the governor as his business manager on the colonized soil;
such a person managed the affairs and administration, as well as
the treasury, of the colony.9
The absence of democratic government in the territory now
known as Quebec continued after France ceded its colony to Brit-
ain in the Treaty of Paris of 1763. At that time, King George III
issued the Royal Proclamation of 1763,10 which imposed British
law over New France, thus submitting the inhabitants to an un-
familiar legal system. The territory was administered by a gover-
nor and an appointed council from which French Canadians were
effectively excluded, as Roman Catholics could not be council
7. See Hon. John D. Richard, Federalism in Canada, 44 DUQ. L. REV. 5 (2005) (giving
a more detailed description of pre-Confederation Canada).
8. In New France, as in France, absolutism and centralization were the principles on
which government was conducted. This may be compared to what Sir J.G. Bourinot de-
scribed as "the great governing principle of the English system, which has developed itself
slowly since the revolution of 1688 - that great principle which makes the ministry of
government of the day responsible both to the sovereign and the legislature for all matters
of administration and legislation, and allows it to continue in office only while it retains the
approval of the people's house." SIR J.G. BOURINOT, A MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF CANADA FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO 1901 154 (Copp, Clark Company Lim-
ited 1901).
9. Although both positions were powerful within the colony, their functions were quite
different. In the final analysis, however, the Governor was the superior of the two.
10. R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1.
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members.11 Just over ten years later, however, the British gov-
ernment attempted to accommodate the French Canadian popula-
tion with the passing of the Quebec Act, 1774.12 This British stat-
ute allowed Roman Catholics to sit on the appointed council,
guaranteed free practice of the Catholic faith, and restored the use
of the French civil law for private matters while maintaining the
use of the English common law for public administration, includ-
ing criminal prosecution.
Nevertheless, the absence of true democracy persisted because
members of the council were not elected by the citizens of the col-
ony. This began to change with the adoption of the Constitutional
Act, 1791,13 an Act of the British Parliament that changed the na-
ture of the Quebec government to accommodate the many English-
speaking settlers, known as the United Empire Loyalists, who had
arrived from the United States following the American Revolution.
This Act divided Quebec in two: the western half became Upper
Canada (now southern Ontario) and the eastern half Lower Can-
ada (now southern Quebec). Representative governments were
established in both colonies with the creation of elected legislative
assemblies. Along with each assembly, there was also an
executive branch of government, the legislative council, whose
members were appointed.
The establishment of a representative legislature led to calls for
responsible government, particularly in Lower Canada. The legis-
lative council, dominated by English Protestants, was completely
unaccountable to and frequently ignored the will of the legislative
assembly, which was composed mainly of French Canadians. 14 In
addition, there was no separation between the judicial and execu-
tive branches of government, as judges were often appointed to the
council. 15 The demands for responsible government were un-
heeded by the British, which led to armed rebellions in the colo-
nies in 1837 and 1838.16
In an attempt to quash the demands of the French Canadians,
Lord Durham was sent from England to investigate the unrest in
the colonies. In his Report on the Affairs of British North America,
11. PATRICK J. MONAHAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 35 (Irwin Law 3d ed. 2006).
12. Quebec Act of 1774, 14 Geo. III c. 83.
13. Constitutional Act of 1791 (31 Geo. 3 (Can.)).
14. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW GROUP, CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 75 (Emond Mont-





he recommended that Upper and Lower Canada be joined. 17 This
recommendation was implemented by the Union Act, 1840,18
which created a united province of Canada with a single legisla-
ture. The union was very much opposed in Lower Canada (now
known as Canada-East), because it merged the much higher pub-
lic debts of Upper Canada (Canada-West) with those of Lower
Canada and gave an equal number of seats in the legislature to
Canada-West and Canada-East, even though the latter had a sig-
nificantly higher population. 19 The Union Act, 1840 cemented its
assimilatory ambitions by declaring English to be the sole lan-
guage of the legislature.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Union Act proved to be a failure,
due in part to ethnic and religious disputes, as well as economic
rivalries between Canada-West and Canada-East. 20 In addition,
Canada-West's population had now surpassed that of Canada-
East, such that the former now demanded representation by popu-
lation in the legislature. 21 It became clear that, in order to ac-
commodate the diversity in the British colonies, a new arrange-
ment would have to be explored. After years of negotiation, the
Dominion of Canada was established by the union of the provinces
of Canada, 22 Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick under the British
North America Act of 1867 (renamed the Constitution Act, 1867 in
1982).23
The goal of the Constitution Act, 1867 was to establish a strong
central government while still allowing for regional diversity.
Therefore, the form of government chosen was a federal structure,
since political leaders believed that "[flederalism was the political
mechanism by which diversity could be reconciled with unity."24
In order to establish a common market, the federal parliament
was given economic powers, including power over trade and com-
merce, transportation and communication, banking, currency, cus-
toms and excise, and other forms of taxation. 25 To acknowledge
17. PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 2-9 (Thomson Carswell 5th ed.
2007).
18. Act of Union, 1840, 3 & 4 Vict. c. 35.
19. Constitutional Law Group, supra note 14, at 76.
20. Id.
21. Hogg, supra note 17, at 2-10.
22. Which was concurrently divided into the provinces of Ontario (formerly Canada-
West) and Quebec (formerly Canada-East).
23. Constitution Act, 1867, (Can.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, as reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App.
II, No. 5.
24. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 43.
25. Constitution Act, 1867 § 91 (Can.).
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the unique status of Quebec, in which civil law rather than com-
mon law governed private law matters, the provinces were given
authority over property and civil rights and the administration of
justice.26 The cultural and political diversity of the new dominion
was also recognized by giving the provinces power over education
and municipal institutions. Interestingly, the concern for accom-
modation of diversity was a harbinger of things to come: today,
Canada is a multicultural country with inhabitants claiming more
than 200 different ethnic origins according to the 2006 census. 27
Along with its cultural landscape, the nature of Canada's Con-
stitution has changed substantially since 1867. While this is due
in part to the formal amendment of its text, it is also a result of
the fact that the Constitution is viewed as a living tree,28 adapting
over time with changes in Canadian society. In 1982, Canada's
constitution was patriated, such that Canada now enjoyed full and
complete national sovereignty and the ability to amend its own
constitution. 29 In addition, Canada's Constitution was amended to
add the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and aboriginal rights
protection. 30 While the text of Canada's Constitution is considered
paramount, the Supreme Court of Canada has identified that it
also includes unwritten conventions and principles. 31 In fact, sev-
eral of these unwritten rules from the Constitution Act, 1867 es-
tablished Canada's democratic governmental structure.
III. CANADA'S GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE AS ESTABLISHED BY
THE CONSTITUTION ACT, 1867
The preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867 states that Canada
is to have "a Constitution similar in principle to that of the United
Kingdom."32 This alone indicates that certain aspects of the Ca-
nadian Constitution would be partly unwritten, as the British
Constitution is itself largely unwritten. 33 Examples of such prin-
26. Id. § 92.
27. Statistics Canada, 2006 Census Release No. 7, Ethnic Origins and Visible Minori-
ties (2 April 2008), http://wwwl2.statcan.ca/english/census06/release/ethnicorigin.cfm.
28. Edwards v. Canada (Attorney General), [1930] A.C. 124 at 136 (J.C.P.C.); Reference
re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, 2004 SCC 79 1 22 (Can.).
29. Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11 (granting Canada full and complete sovereignty).
30. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 2.
31. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 32; Reference re Remuneration
of Judges of the Provincial Court (P.E.I.), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 443 92 (Can.); Reference re
Resolution to Amend the Constitution, (1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, 874 (Can.).
32. See preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 23.
33. Monahan, supra note 11, at 55.
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ciples are the related tenets of representative government and
parliamentary supremacy. These principles, employed to some
extent by the British colonies prior to formation of the Union, hold
that laws can only be made by an elected legislature and not by
the Crown.34 This concept was recognized in the Bill of Rights of
168935 in England. Furthermore, parliamentary supremacy al-
lows any of the prerogative powers held by the Crown36 to be abol-
ished by an act of Parliament. There is, however, one important
limit to parliamentary supremacy that acts as a safeguard against
abuses of power by both the federal and provincial legislative
branches: namely, that the laws must comply with the Canadian
Constitution. The judiciary ensures that the legislative branch
abides by this important limit, known as constitutional suprem-
acy.
Another unwritten principle adopted from the British Constitu-
tion is that of responsible government, which has been identified
by Canadian constitutional scholar Peter Hogg as "the most im-
portant non-federal characteristic of the Canadian
[C]onstitution. 37 This principle allows Canada's formal head of
state to be an unelected monarch (currently Queen Elizabeth II),
yet still be a modern democracy. This is accomplished by the re-
quirement that the powers of the Crown be exercised only with the
advice of those individuals who control a majority of the votes in
the legislature. 38
In Canada, the Crown's powers have been transferred to her
Canadian representative, the Governor General. As head of state,
the Governor General has the responsibilities of appointing the
Prime Minister, members of cabinet, senators, superior court
judges, and the lieutenant governors, who are the Queen's repre-
sentatives in the provinces. The Governor General possesses little
actual authority, however, as virtually all of his or her powers
must be exercised with the advice and consent of the Prime Minis-
ter and cabinet. 39 Since the Prime Minister and cabinet members
are required to be members of the legislative branch, the executive
has considerable control over the affairs of the legislature. Given
that both the federal and provincial legislatures are elected by
34. Id. at 32.
35. 1 Will. & Mar. sess. 2, c. 2.
36. "The Crown" is used in Canada to refer to the executive branch of government.
37. Hogg, supra note 17, at 9-5.




means of universal adult suffrage, responsible government results
in the provision of an executive that both reflects the electorate's
wishes and is able to execute the legislature's policies.
40
The principle of responsible government entails certain consti-
tutional conventions. Constitutional conventions are unwritten
rules, somewhere between custom and law, that prescribe the
manner in which legal powers should be exercised.41 For example,
by convention, the Governor General will not refuse to sign a legis-
lative bill that has been approved by both Houses of Parliament.
42
While courts may recognize the existence of constitutional conven-
tions,43 they cannot enforce them. Though an absence of a formal
enforcement mechanism may imply that conventions are not suit-
able vehicles for enforcing the rule of law, conventions are nearly
always obeyed because of the political ramifications that would
result upon their breach. 44 Furthermore, both the nature and
purpose of conventions are incompatible with their inclusion as
legally enforceable, written constitutional provisions.45 As noted
in the Patriation Reference case, constitutional conventions "en-
sure that the legal framework of the constitution will be operated
in accordance with the prevailing constitutional values or princi-
ples of the period. '46 Thus, constitutional conventions support the
"living tree" principle that underlies the Canadian Constitution.
The constitutional principles of a representative and responsible
government, as well as the conventions entailed by them, illus-
trate that the relationship among the three branches of the Cana-
dian government is not governed by a strict application of separa-
tion of powers.
40. PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 281 (Thomson Carswell, Stu-
dent ed. 2004).
41. Hogg, supra note 17, at 1-21; Re Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to Amend the
Constitution, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793, 802 (Can.).
42. Hogg, supra note 17, at 1-22.
43. See e.g., Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 (Can.)
(where the Court found that while no convention required unanimity for certain constitu-
tional amendments, a substantial degree of provincial consent was required); Re Objection
by Quebec to a Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1982] 2 S.C.R. at 802 (where it was
held that there was no convention allowing Quebec to veto constitutional amendments
affecting its legislative competence); Ontario (Attorney General) v. OPSEU, [1987] 2 S.C.R.
2 99 (Can.) (per Beetz J finding that there is a constitutional convention of political neu-
trality in the provincial public service).
44. Re Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1982] 2 S.C.R.
at 802.
45. Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] S.C.R. at 774-75.
46. Id. at 880.
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IV. THE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT
A. The Legislature
The federal legislative branch,47 also known as Parliament, is
composed of the Queen (represented by the Governor General), the
House of Commons, and the Senate. 48 The House of Commons is
formed of elected members (Members of Parliament) who each
represent a particular electoral district, also known as a constitu-
ency or riding. The seats in the Senate are assigned on a regional
basis, and each senator is appointed by the Governor General
upon the advice of the Prime Minister. While the composition of
the House of Commons can theoretically change entirely after a
federal election, senators may retain their seat until their manda-
tory retirement at the age of 75.49
Parliament is the only branch of government that can make
laws in areas of federal jurisdiction and the only branch with the
authority to supply public moneys for the government's use. Ex-
cept for money bills, which must originate in the House of Com-
mons, bills can be proposed in either House. For a bill to become
law, it must be approved by a majority of each House and signed
by the Governor General. However, as previously explained, the
Governor General's signature is only a formality, since the princi-
ple of responsible government requires that he or she must act on
the advice of the people controlling the majority of the House of
Commons.
The legislative branches of the provincial governments are uni-
cameral with only an elected legislative assembly and no upper
house.50 The provincial legislative assemblies are the only branch
with the authority to enact laws related to provincial jurisdiction.
Similar to the federal Parliament, once a bill is approved by a ma-
jority of the legislative assembly, it must be signed by the lieuten-
ant governor of the province in order to become law.
While the legislative branch is the only branch of government
that can make laws, Parliament and the provincial legislatures
may delegate some of their law-making power to the executive.51
47. For the powers of the federal legislative branch, see Constitution Act, 1867, supra
note 23, §§ 17-57.
48. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (Can.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5
(Appendix 1985), § 17.
49. Id. § 29(2).
50. Id. §§ 69-90 (for the powers of the provincial legislative branch).
51. This is true also for the provincial legislative assemblies.
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This delegated legislation, which may come in the form of regula-
tions, bylaws, rules, or orders, does not have to be voted upon by
either House, nor does the Governor General have to sign it in or-
der for it to come in effect. There appears to be virtually no limit
to the powers that Parliament may delegate to the executive.
52
Thus, as noted by Hogg, "in Canada there is no requirement that




As in all Parliamentary systems, Canada has a dual executive,
with a formal head of state (the Governor General or Lieutenant
Governor representing the Queen) and a political head of state. At
the federal level, the Prime Minister is the leader of the party that
commands the majority of the House of Commons.54 The Premier
is the leader of the party that commands the majority of the seats
in the provincial legislative assembly.
The Governor General also appoints ministers who are selected
by the Prime Minister and who must be elected members of Par-
liament, as required by the principle of responsible government.
The Prime Minister also has the power to dismiss his or her min-
isters at pleasure and to advise the Governor General as to when
Parliament should be dissolved for an election. Together, the
Prime Minister and his or her ministers form the cabinet, which is
the supreme executive authority.55 The cabinet is responsible for
developing and implementing all executive policies and for admin-
istering the federal government departments. 56 In addition to the
Prime Minister, the cabinet, and the government departments, the
executive also comprises the civil service, the armed forces, and
the police.
Generally speaking, the executive branch has the power to exe-
cute the laws enacted by the legislature and to spend the public
moneys. The executive derives its powers either from its common-
law prerogative powers or its statutory powers. 57 The prerogative
powers, which have their origins in the inherent powers of the
52. It remains unclear in the jurisprudence whether Parliament can delegate the tax-
ing power to the executive: see the discussion in Hogg, supra note 17, at 14-6 to 14-8.
53. Hogg, supra note 17, at 14-4 to 14-5.
54. Id. at 9-9.
55. Id. at 9-10.
56. Id. at 9-10 to 9-11.
57. Monahan, supra note 11, at 59-60.
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British monarch, exist today in only a limited fashion because
they can be abolished by the legislature. 58 Examples of preroga-
tive powers still in existence include the powers to appoint the
Prime Minister and the cabinet, form treaties, issue passports,
declare war, and grant appointments and honours. 59
The executive's power may also find its source in a statute en-
acted by the legislature. As mentioned previously, this delegated
power may include the authority to enact legislation in the form of
regulations. An important limitation on the executive's power to
act exists: it cannot exceed the jurisdiction given to it by the legis-
lature. This flows from the notion of the rule of law, as noted by
the Supreme Court of Canada in Roncarelli v. Duplessis,60 where
Justice Rand opined:
[T]hat an administration according to law is to be superseded
by action dictated by and according to the arbitrary likes, dis-
likes and irrelevant purposes of public officers acting beyond
their duty, would signalize the beginning of disintegration of
the rule of law as a fundamental postulate of our constitu-
tional structure.61
C. The Judiciary
It is the third branch of government, the judiciary, that ensures
that the legislature and the executive respect the rule of law.
Canada has provincial, territorial, and federal courts, with the
Supreme Court of Canada acting as a court of final appeal for all
Canadian courts. The Supreme Court of Canada was established
by federal statute in 187562 under section 101 of the Constitution
Act, 1867,63 which authorized Parliament "to provide for the con-
stitution, maintenance, and organization of a general court of ap-
peal for Canada." While there is a limited right of appeal in the
criminal context, most cases require leave to appeal. 64 The ap-
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Roncarelli, [1959] S.C.R. at 140.
61. Id.
62. Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act, 1875 S.C. ch. 11; now the Supreme Court Act,
R.S.C., ch. S-26 (1985).
63. Constitution Act, 1867, (Can.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, as reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App.
II, No. 5.
64. Hogg, supra note 17, at 8-13.
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pointment and salaries of the Supreme Court justices are the pro-
vision of the federal government.
65
The Canadian federal courts were established under section 101
of the Constitution Act, 1867, "for the better administration of the
laws of Canada. '66 Unlike the provincial superior courts, the fed-
eral courts have no inherent jurisdiction and have authority over
only those matters assigned to them by federal statutes.67 The
Federal Court of Canada has jurisdiction over matters such as
patents, trademarks, copyright, and admiralty, as well as perform-
ing judicial review of decisions issued by federal administrative
tribunals. The Tax Court of Canada was established for the pri-
mary purpose of reviewing income tax appeals. 68 Appeals from
both the Federal Court and the Tax Court are heard in the Fed-
eral Court of Appeal. 69 A final federal court is the Court Martial
Appeal Court, whose main role is to hear appeals from military
courts ("courts martial") established under the National Defence
Act.70 The judges of the federal court are appointed and paid by
the federal government.
All provinces have superior courts, which have both trial divi-
sions and courts of appeal. The provincial superior courts have
inherent jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters within the
province.7 1 As required by the Constitution, these judges are ap-
pointed and their salaries are paid by the federal government.
72
There are also provincial inferior courts, whose judges are ap-
pointed and paid by the provincial governments. These courts are
staffed by magistrates or justices of the peace and have jurisdic-
tion over small civil claims and minor criminal offences. 73 There
are also territorial courts established by the federal government
for each of the three Canadian territories: Yukon, Northwest Ter-
ritories, and Nunavut.
7 4
As noted by the Supreme Court of Canada, the constitutional
guarantee of a federally staffed and remunerated provincial supe-
65. Supreme Court Act, § 4(2).
66. Constitution Act, 1867 § 101 (Can.).
67. Hogg, supra note 17, at 7-27.
68. Tax Court of Canada Act, R.S.C., ch. T-2, § 12 (1985).
69. Federal Courts Act, R.S.C., ch. F-7, § 27 (1985); Tax Court of Canada Act, § 17.6.
70. R.S.C, ch. N-5 (1985).
71. Hogg, supra note 17, at 7-3.
72. Constitution Act, 1867, (Can.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, as reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App.
II, No. 5, as. 96 & 100.
73. Hogg, supra note 17, at 7-2.
74. Northwest Territories Act, R.S.C., ch. N-27, §§ 32-39; Yukon Act, 2002 S.C., ch. 7,
§§ 38-44; Nunavut Act, 1993 S.C. ch. 28, §§ 31-36.
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rior court system, as well as the other judicature sections in the
Constitution,75 serve to guarantee judicial independence and "may
be seen as one of ultimate safeguards of the rule of law. '76 As
noted by Hogg:
The independence of the judge from the other branches of gov-
ernment is especially significant, because it provides an as-
surance that the state will be subjected to the rule of law. If
the state could count on the courts to ratify all legislative and
executive actions, even if unauthorized by law, the individual
would have no protection against tyranny.
77
Judicial independence, which requires both actual and per-
ceived independence of the judiciary from the other branches of
government, is constitutionally guaranteed not only by the judica-
ture provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867, but also by its status
as an unwritten principle of the Constitution and by section 11(d)
of the Charter.78 While the judicature sections apply only to pro-
tect the independence of the superior courts and the Charter ap-
plies only to courts that exercise jurisdiction over offences, 79 the
unwritten principle extends judicial independence to all Canadian
courts.8 0 This principle has its source in the preamble to the Con-
stitution Act, 1867.81 As previously mentioned, the preamble
states that Canada's constitution was to be similar in principle to
that of the United Kingdom, which has constitutionally guaran-
teed judicial independence since the Act of Settlement of 1701.82
The Supreme Court of Canada has held that judicial independ-
ence, which may refer to the individual independence of judges or
the institutional independence of the court or tribunal,8 3 requires
75. Constitution Act, 1867, (Can.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, as reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App.
II, No. 5, §§ 96-101.
76. Reference re Amendments to the Residential Tenancies Act, [1996] N.S.R. 22 72;
see also McEvoy v. Attorney General for New Brunswick et al., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 704 at 720.
77. Hogg, supra note 17, at 7-8.
78. Section 11: Any person charged with an offence has the right ... (d) to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independ-
ent and impartial tribunal: Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
79. PEI Judges Reference, [1998] S.C.R. 99 83-84.
80. Id. 106.
81. The Queen v. Beauregard, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56 at 20-21; PEI Judges Reference, [1998]
2 S.C.R. 83.
82. PEI Judges Reference, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 1 106.
83. Id. 118; Valente v. The Queen, [19851 2 S.C.R. 673 20.
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security of tenure, financial independence, and administrative
independence.8 4
While judicial independence is a foundational principle of the
Canadian Constitution, it does not prohibit an overlap between
the judiciary and the other branches of government. The legisla-
tive branch can confer some non-judicial functions on the courts
and also some adjudicative functions on the executive.8 5 There is
one important limitation on the latter: the legislature cannot
transfer the core powers of a superior court to an inferior court or
administrative tribunal. This restriction exists to ensure that the
legislature cannot evade the constitutional requirements of sec-
tions 96 and 100 of the Constitution Act, 1867.86
The non-judicial powers granted to the judiciary include the
government's ability to refer a question of law to the courts for an
advisory opinion. Several courts in Canada have the power to de-
cide reference questions, including the Supreme Court of Canada,
which has held that its authority to do so is constitutionally
valid.8 7 In the Quebec Secession Reference case, in which the Su-
preme Court was asked to give an advisory opinion on the ability
of Quebec to unilaterally secede from Canada, the Court noted
that its authority to answer reference questions differs from juris-
dictions such as the United States, where the constitution insists
on a strict separation of powers.88 The Court stated:
[T]he Canadian Constitution does not insist on a strict sepa-
ration of powers. Parliament and the provincial legislatures
may properly confer other legal functions on the courts, and
may confer certain judicial functions on bodies that are not
courts. The exception to this rule relates only to s. 96 courts.
Thus, even though the rendering of advisory opinions is quite
clearly done outside the framework of adversarial litigation,
and such opinions are traditionally obtained by the executive
from the law officers of the Crown, there is no constitutional
bar to this Court's receipt of jurisdiction to undertake such an
advisory role.8 9
84. PEI Judges Reference, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 9 115.
85. Quebec Secession Reference, [1998] S.C.R. 15; Hogg, supra note 17, at 7-37.
86. McEvoy, [1983] 1 S.C.R. at 720; Re Residential Tenancies, (1998] 15 S.C.R. 72;
MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 725 15.
87. Quebec Secession Reference, [1998] 2 C.S.R. NJ 9-15.
88. Id. T 13.
89. Id. 9 15.
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In both its adjudicative and advisory roles, the Canadian judi-
cial branch will often fulfill its responsibility of ensuring that the
government complies with the Constitution and the rule of law.
V. ROLE OF THE COURTS IN ENSURING THAT THE EXECUTIVE AND
LEGISLATURE COMPLY WITH CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RULE
OF LAW
The Constitution of a country is a statement of the will of the
people to be governed in accordance with certain principles
held as fundamental and certain prescriptions restrictive of
the powers of the legislature and government. It is, as s. 52 of
the Constitution Act, 1982 declares, the "supreme law" of the
nation, unalterable by the normal legislative process, and un-
suffering of laws inconsistent with it. The duty of the judici-
ary is to interpret and apply the laws of Canada and each of
the provinces, and it is thus our duty to ensure that the con-
stitutional law prevails. 90
As expressed above by the Supreme Court of Canada in the
Manitoba Language Rights Reference case, the duty of the judici-
ary to ensure that all government action complies with the Cana-
dian constitution is found in section 52(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982, which states: "The Constitution of Canada is the supreme
law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provi-
sions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of
no force or effect."91 The areas over which the judiciary has been
particularly vigilant include federalism and the division of powers,
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and aboriginal rights.
A. Federalism and the Division of Powers92
Canada's federal structure protects against tyranny because
powers are divided between central and regional governments. 93
As noted by the Supreme Court of Canada, "[t]he federal-
provincial division of powers was a legal recognition of the diver-
sity that existed among the initial members of Confederation, and
manifested a concern to accommodate that diversity within a sin-
90. Manitoba Language Rights Reference, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 48.
91. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
92. I previously gave a more detailed description of Canadian federalism in Hon. John
D. Richard, "Federalism in Canada," supra note 7.
93. Hogg, supra note 17, at 5-15.
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gle nation by granting significant powers to provincial govern-
ments."94 The division of powers between the federal government
and the provinces allowed minorities to become majorities in sub-
national units, while still benefiting from being a part of a greater
nation.
95
Although the intention of the Fathers of Confederation was to
create a strong central government, the provincial governments
were not subordinate to the federal government, nor were they
delegates of the British Parliament. 96 While the federal govern-
ment was given the constitutional authority to veto provincial leg-
islation,97 this "power of disallowance" fell into disuse by the mid-
20th century and is now considered to have been abandoned.98
The powers assigned to the federal government are delineated in
section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867. As mentioned previously,
the federal government was given powers that were seen as neces-
sary for national unity, such as currency, navigation and shipping,
the postal service, and taxation. The provincial government's
powers were generally limited to local matters.
The Constitution Act, 1867 was drafted with the objective of
clearly delineating the powers between the provincial and federal
governments so that conflicts of jurisdiction would not be an is-
sue.99 However, a combination of the ambiguous language used in
sections 91 and 92 and the unanticipated increasing role of gov-
ernment in Canadian society would invite significant constitu-
tional litigation.100 This required the courts to interpret the vari-
ous heads of power and "to control the limits of the respective sov-
ereignties of the two plenary governments [.]"101
Based simply on a textual interpretation of the Constitution, the
federal government's powers could easily have broadened over
time, since several of the provisions appeared to trump provincial
authority. However, by interpreting the Constitution against the
backdrop of the federalism principle, the courts ensured that the
balance of power between the federal and provincial governments
94. Quebec Secession Reference, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 217 43.
95. Richard, supra note 7, at 26.
96. Reference re: Liquor License Act of 1877, [1883] 9 A.C. 117 (ONT. J. L.P.C.).
97. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5
(Appendix 1985).
98. Hogg, supra note 17, at 5-19.
99. W.P.M. Kennedy, The Interpretation of the British North America Act (1943) 8
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 146 at 151.
100. Monahan, supra note 11, at 231-32.
101. N. Telecom Can. Ltd. v. Commc'n Workers of Can., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 733, 741 (Can.).
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was respected. 10 2 This is evident in early decisions of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in London, which at the time ex-
ercised appellate jurisdiction over the Supreme Court of Canada.
For example, in Citizens Insurance Company of Canada v. Par-
sons,10 3 the Privy Council gave a broad interpretation to the pro-
vincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights within the prov-
ince, found in section 92(13). This was justified in part by the
need for Quebec to be able to regulate its private affairs using its
civil code.
The courts also ensured that the jurisdiction given to the federal
and provincial jurisdictions could evolve over time, while still re-
specting the balance of power between the two levels of govern-
ment. This was necessary in part because there were certain ar-
eas to which the framers of the Constitution clearly did not turn
their minds-because they simply did not exist in 1867. However,
contrary to assertions that such "new" subjects should automati-
cally fall to the federal government, the Supreme Court of Canada
insisted that this would be the case only where the new matter
has "a singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly
distinguishes it from matters of provincial concern and a scale of
impact on provincial jurisdiction that is reconcilable with the fun-
damental distribution of legislative power under the Constitu-
tion."10
4
It is important to understand that federalism does not concern
itself merely with the division of powers between the federal and
provincial governments; it also "recognizes the diversity of the
component parts of Confederation."10 5 One way in which the prin-
ciple of federalism is acknowledged outside the context of the divi-
sion of powers is in statutory interpretation. The equal authentic-
ity rule provides that "both language versions of a bilingual stat-
ute or regulation are official, original, and authoritative expres-
sions of the law"'1 6 and that "[n]either version has the status of a
copy or translation; neither enjoys priority or paramountcy over
the other."' 0 7 As a consequence of this rule, where there is a dis-
crepancy between the English and French versions of legislation,
the courts must first search for a meaning shared by both ver-
102. Quebec Secession Reference, (1998] 2 S.C.R. 1 55.
103. [1881-1885] All E.R.1179 (P.C.).
104. R. v. Crown Zellerbach Can. Ltd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 1 33 (Can.).
105. Quebec Secession Reference, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 1 58.
106. Medovarski v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2004] 4 F.C.R.
48 76 affd [2005] 2 S.C.R. 539 (Can.).
107. Medovarski, 4 F.C.R. 76.
Fall 2009
Duquesne Law Review
sions.10 8 In recognition of parliamentary supremacy, "[t]he shared
meaning must be compatible with the intention of the legislature,
as determined by the ordinary rules of interpretation."'10 9
Canada's commitment to diversity did not stop with its adher-
ence to the constitutional principle of federalism, however. As the
nation developed, Canada's constitution, initially designed to pro-
tect the interests of two cultures, English and French, has been
expanded and strengthened in order to better reflect the cultural
diversity of its citizens." 0
B. Charter of Rights and Freedoms
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the "Charter") was consti-
tutionally entrenched in 1982 to protect individual and collective
rights and freedoms.' Parliament's first effort to recognize and
protect certain fundamental rights was in the form of an ordinary
statute rather than a constitutional amendment. The 1960 Cana-
dian Bill of Rights," 2 which is still in force today, protected a wide
range of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, religion, and a
guarantee of equality. 13 However, as the Bill of Rights was a fed-
eral statute, it did not protect against infringement of rights by
provincial legislation. Furthermore, courts interpreted the Bill
extremely narrowly, which was likely due to the courts' discomfort
with invalidating legislation based simply on a statutory (rather
than a constitutional) grant of power to do So.114 In order for
rights-protection to have any teeth, it was clear that these rights
would have to be constitutionally entrenched.
With the advent of the Charter, certain individual and collective
rights and freedoms were protected against incursion by both fed-
eral and provincial legislation and action. The rights are catego-
rized into fundamental freedoms (such as freedom of association);
democratic rights (such as the right to vote); mobility rights (in-
108. Id. 24; R. Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, (LexisNexis 5th ed.
2008) at 100.
109. Medovarski, 4 C.F.R. 1 78 (citing PIERHE-ANDR9 COTP,, THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGISLATION IN CANADA 328 (Carswell 3d ed. 2000)); see also R. v. Daoust, [2004] 1 S.C.R.
217 1 30 (Can.).
110. Richard, supra note 7, at 27, citing Government of Canada, Minister of State (Mul-
ticulturalism), Canadian Heritage, The Canadian Multiculturalism Act - 15 Years Later,
http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/progs/multi/reports/ann2002-2003/01 e.cfm.
111. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
112. R.S.C., ch. 44 (1960).
113. Id. at s. 1.
114. ROBERT J. SHARPE & KENT ROACH, THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS (Irwin
Law 3d ed. 2005).
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cluding the right to gain a livelihood in any province); legal rights
(such as the rights to life, liberty, and security of the person);
equality rights; language rights; and minority language educa-
tional rights. Both the provincial and federal executive and legis-
lative branches are required to abide by these rights, 115 or they
risk having their enactments or actions declared "of no force or
effect" by the judicial branch. Even the Crown's prerogative pow-
ers may be at risk of Charter review. As held by the Ontario
Court of Appeal in Black v. Chrgtien,116 the exercise of a Crown
prerogative will be reviewable if it affects the rights or legitimate
expectations of individuals (such as issuing a passport). However,
a matter of high policy, such as the declaration of war, for which
public considerations outweigh individual rights will not be sub-
ject to review by the courts.
While allowing the judicial branch to enforce the constitution-
ally guaranteed rights and freedoms may appear to be consistent
with Montesquieu's promotion of individual liberty, some scholars
have alleged that the Charter created a tyranny of its own,
namely, that of the judiciary over the democratically-elected legis-
latures.11 7 It is uncontroversial that the Charter changed the na-
ture of constitutional judicial review. Previously, the main focus
of constitutional jurisprudence was which level of government,
federal or provincial, had the authority to act. Under the Charter,
the courts were asked "whether certain kinds of laws should be
ruled off-limits to governments in general."' 18 This mandate, how-
ever, was given to the courts by the provincial and federal legisla-
tures, and the courts have the constitutional duty to ensure that
the laws comply with the Charter.119 With the advent of the Char-
ter, Canada has thus moved from a regime of parliamentary su-
premacy to one of constitutional supremacy.1 20 As stated in the
Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Vriend v. Alberta:
Quite simply, it is not the courts which limit the legislatures.
Rather, it is the Constitution, which must be interpreted by
the courts, that limits the legislatures. This is necessarily
true of all constitutional democracies. Citizens must have the
115. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
116. [2001], 54 O.R. 3d 215 (Can.).
117. F.L. MORTON & RAINER KNOPFF, THE CHARTER REVOLUTION AND THE COURT PARTY
(Broadview Press 2000).
118. Monahan, supra note 11, at 16.
119. Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 132, 134 (Can.).
120. Vriend, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 131.
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right to challenge laws which they consider to be beyond the
powers of the legislatures. When such a challenge is properly
made, the courts must, pursuant to their constitutional duty,
rule on the challenge.
121
Furthermore, the structure of the Charter and the remedies
available under it can be seen as encouraging a "democratic dia-
logue" between the courts and legislatures. 122 The dialogue theory
has been explained in the following way by the Supreme Court of
Canada:
In reviewing legislative enactments and executive decisions to
ensure constitutional validity, the courts speak to the legisla-
tive and executive branches. As has been pointed out, most of
the legislation held not to pass constitutional muster has been
followed by new legislation designed to accomplish similar ob-
jectives. By doing this, the legislature responds to the courts;
hence the dialogue among the branches.
123
Certain provisions of the Charter encourage judicial respect for
the legislative and executive branches. 24 Section 1 stipulates that
the rights and freedoms laid out by the Charter are subject "to
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society."' 25 This allows the gov-
ernment to justify encroachment upon rights if its objective is
pressing and substantial; the infringement is rationally connected
to the goal of the legislation; the impugned provision minimally
impairs the right in question; and the attainment of the legislative
objective is not outweighed by the violation of the right. 26 Section
7 provides that a person's rights to life, liberty, and security of the
person may be limited if such limitation is "in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice."'127 Finally, the legislative over-
ride clause, section 33, allows the legislature to supersede a judi-
121. Id. 56.
122. The dialogue theory was first suggested in the article by Peter W. Hogg & Allison A.
Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of
Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing After All), 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75 (1997). For further
commentary on the dialogue theory of Charter review, see the articles collected at Charter
Dialogue: Ten Years Later, 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1 (2005); KENT ROACH, THE SUPREME
COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE (Irwin Law 2001).
123. Vriend, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 138 (internal citations omitted).
124. Id. 137.
125. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
126. Vriend, [1998] 1 S.C.R. at para. 108; see also R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.).
127. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
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cial determination that a law violates the fundamental freedoms
(section 2), legal rights (section 7-14), or equality rights (section
15) guaranteed in the Charter. As perceived by Justice Iacobucci,
"[t]his dialogue between the accountability of each of the branches
[has] the effect of enhancing the democratic process, not denying
it.,,128
The dialogue between the courts and the legislature can also be
seen in how the courts fashion remedies in the event of a Charter
violation. While section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 is a
clear pronouncement of the effect of the declaration of a law's un-
constitutionality, 129 the courts will take into account such concerns
as "the proper institutional division of labour between courts and
legislatures"'130 in devising remedies involving legislation. Section
24(1) allows the courts to devise remedies that "the court consid-
ers appropriate and just in the circumstances."'
131
For example, courts may "read down" an unconstitutional law
by giving it a narrow interpretation that complies with the Char-
ter.132 In R. v. Grant,133 the Supreme Court of Canada read down
a provision in the Narcotics Control Act 34 to render it compliant
with the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.
In his reasons for judgment, Justice Sopinka explained one objec-
tive of this remedy: "[t]he remedy of 'reading down' far from
usurping the legislative role of Parliament preserves the objec-
tives of Parliament in so far as is possible within constitutional
parameters."13
5
If a statute is under-inclusive such that it does not protect those
who have a constitutional right to its protection, the court may
interpret the statute broadly so as to include those it should
cover.' 36 This remedy was used in Vriend137 to include homosexu-
ality as a prohibited ground of discrimination in Alberta's human
rights legislation since its exclusion from the Alberta statute vio-
128. Vriend, [19981 1 S.C.R. 139.
129. Section 52(1) states: 'The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada,
and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of
the inconsistency, of no force or effect." Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
130. Sharpe & Roach, supra note 113, at 348.
131. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
132. See, e.g., R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452; R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45; Slaight
Commc'ns Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038.
133. [1993] 3 S.C.R. 223.
134. R.S.C., ch. N-1, § 10 (repealed 1996 by ch. 19, § 94).
135. Grant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. at 245.
136. Sharpe & Roach, supra note 114, at 351.
137. [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493.
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lated Charter equality rights. While reading in appears to allow
courts to exercise a legislative role, 138 "the purpose of reading in is
to be as faithful as possible within the requirements of the Consti-
tution to the scheme enacted by the Legislature."'139 This objective
is also pursued by the remedies of partially invalidating a statute
or severing the unconstitutional portion of a statute.140
If an entire statute or a portion of a statute is struck down be-
cause it is unconstitutional, the courts will occasionally suspend
its invalidity temporarily to give time for the legislative branch to
respond appropriately. 141 This may occur in cases where "the im-
mediate nullification of that law could lead to chaos or a serious
threat to public safety."'142 In Manitoba Language Rights Refer-
ence, 43 the Supreme Court held that Manitoba's unilingual legisla-
tion violated the language rights protected in the Charter. However,
the court recognized that the immediate invalidation of Manitoba's
unilingual legislation would result in an absence of the rule of law




In addition to the protection of rights and freedoms in the Char-
ter, the Constitution Act, 1982 also entrenched "[t]he existing abo-
riginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada[.]"'145
Since the nature of these rights was unclear, 146 courts have been
required to define their content.
One of the legal rights confirmed under the Constitution Act,
1982 is aboriginal title; however, it is not derived from the Consti-
tution or from British law, but from aboriginal peoples' historic
occupation of the land. 47 Aboriginal title is recognized where the
connection between the aboriginal peoples and the land was of
138. Sharpe & Roach, supra note 114, at 351; KENT ROACH, CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES
IN CANADA, para. 14.1250 (Cartwright Group 2006).
139. Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, 700.
140. Id.; see, e.g., R. v. Lucas, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439.
141. See, e.g., Manitoba Language Rights Reference, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721; R. v. Demers,
[2004] 2 S.C.R. 489 (Can.).
142. Sharpe & Roach, supra note 114, at 355.
143. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721.
144. Id. 59-60.
145. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K). In
addition, note that section 25 of the Charter states that the Charter is not to be interpreted
as to "abrogate or derogate" from any aboriginal or treaty rights.
146. Monahan, supra note 11, at 440.
147. Calder v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1973] S.C.R. 313, 328 (Can.).
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"central significance to their distinctive culture."148 It has been
defined as a sui generis right because of its unique features, in-
cluding the fact that it is inalienable except to the Crown. As a
consequence of the inalienability of title, if an aboriginal group
wishes to sell a parcel of land to a third party, it must first sur-
render the land to the Crown. 149 This imposes a fiduciary obliga-
tion on the Crown to deal with the surrendered land in the best
interests of the aboriginal people. 150 Since aboriginal title is con-
stitutionally protected, aboriginal peoples may seek redress via
the courts if the fiduciary obligation is not satisfied.
151
Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 also recognizes other
aboriginal rights that are not connected to land. These rights in-
clude activities that are "element[s] of a practice, custom or tradi-
tion integral to the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group
claiming the right."' 52 Prior to the enactment of section 35, Par-
liament could extinguish these aboriginal rights (and aboriginal
title) simply by enacting legislation, due to the principle of par-
liamentary supremacy. 153 While section 35 prevents the legisla-
tive branch from simply extinguishing these rights by statute, the
Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that infringement of
these rights may be justified. Allowing infringement in certain
circumstances is done to balance the interests of "[a]boriginal
rights on the one hand and the legitimate continuing role of Par-
liament and the provincial legislatures to advance the collective
interests of the community as a whole, including the interests of
the [a]boriginal peoples of Canada, on the other."'154 If an aborigi-
nal right has been affected negatively by the government, the bur-
den is on the government to justify the infringement and to show
that the legislation's objective is attained in a manner that up-
holds the honour of the Crown.1 55 The government must first
demonstrate that the impugned legislation was enacted for a com-
pelling and substantial objective. 156 Furthermore, the court must
ensure that the right is not unduly restricted and investigate
148. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 para. 137 (Can.) (citing R. v.
Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101 26 (Can.)).
149. Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 376 (Can.).
150. Guerin, [1984] 2 S.C.R. at 370.
151. Id.
152. R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 46 (Can.).
153. Monahan, supra note 11, at 461.
154. Id.
155. R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
156. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
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whether the restriction can be reconciled with the Crown's fiduci-
ary relationship with aboriginal peoples.1
57
VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
The courts also exercise supervisory authority over decision-
makers within the executive branch of government to ensure that
they comply with the rule of law.158 This role necessarily engages
the concept of the separation of powers and the interplay among
legislative intent, administrative autonomy, and judicial over-
sight. These issues were addressed in the recent Supreme Court
case Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick,159 in which Justices Bastarache
and LeBel wrote:
As a matter of constitutional law, judicial review is intimately
connected with the preservation of the rule of law. It is essen-
tially that constitutional foundation which explains the pur-
pose of judicial review and guides its function and operation.
Judicial review seeks to address an underlying tension be-
tween the rule of law and the foundational democratic princi-
ple, which finds an expression in the initiatives of Parliament
and legislatures to create various administrative bodies and
endow them with broad powers. Courts, while exercising
their constitutional functions of judicial review, must be sen-
sitive not only to the need to uphold the rule of law, but also
to the necessity of avoiding undue interference with the dis-
charge of administrative functions in respect of the matters
delegated to administrative bodies by Parliament and legisla-
tures. 160
One consequence of the principle of parliamentary supremacy is
that administrative bodies may exercise only the power afforded to
them by the legislature. Judicial review ensures that these statu-
tory bodies do not exceed the authority given to them by statute. 161
Constitutional supremacy is also maintained because the courts
157. Id.
158. I previously discussed judicial review in Canada in Judicial Review in Canada, 45
DUQ. L. REV. 483 (2007). Some significant changes in the law have occurred since the pub-
lication of that article, which I will highlight in this portion of the paper.





ensure that the administrative bodies comply with the Constitu-
tion, including the Charter, in exercising their functions.
162
The Constitution also provides the source of the courts' duty to
exercise a supervisory function over administrative action. Sec-
tions 96 to 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 give the provincial
superior courts the inherent power of judicial review. 163 The Fed-
eral Court and the Federal Court of Appeal have jurisdiction to
hear judicial review applications based on section 18 of the Fed-
eral Courts Act. 164 The federal and provincial courts' power of ju-
dicial review extends to both procedural matters and substantive
outcomes of administrative decision-making.
An administrative body may owe procedural fairness to an indi-
vidual in some circumstances. Procedural fairness, at common
law, may entail the right to receive notice of an impending deci-
sion, the right to be heard, the right to be given reasons for a deci-
sion, and the right to receive a decision free from actual or per-
ceived bias. In determining both the content of procedural fair-
ness and whether it is even owed in the first place, courts will look
at legislative intent and the nature of the administrative body.
For example, if the decision is of a legislative nature, such as the
enactment of regulations involving general policy matters,1 65 no
procedural fairness will be owed to affected individuals. 166 The
Supreme Court has also warned, especially with regard to pre-
liminary decision-making, that the courts must "remain alert to
the danger of unduly burdening and complicating the law enforce-
ment investigative process."1 67 However, even where the decision
is not final in nature, the greater the impact of the decision on an
individual's rights, the greater the likelihood that procedural fair-
ness will be owed.168 While the right to common-law procedural
fairness can be overruled by statute, other sources may offer a
guarantee of procedural fairness, such as the Charter, the Cana-
dian Bill of Rights, or provincial procedural codes.
169
162. DAVID J. MULLAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9-10 (Irwin Law 2001); Dunsmuir, [2008] 1
S.C.R. 190 28 (Can.).
163. Dunsmuir, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (Can.).
164. See supra note 69.
165. Nat'l Anti-Poverty Org. v. Canada (A-G), [1989] 3 F.C. 684 (Can.).
166. Cardinal v. Dir. of Kent Inst., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643 14 (Can.); Martineau v. Matsqui
Institution, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602 at 628 (Can.).
167. Irvine v. Canada (Restrictive Trade Practices Comm'n), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 181 87
(Can.).
168. Knight v. Indian Head Sch. Div. No. 19, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653 (Can.).
169. See, e.g., Ontario's Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O., ch. S. 22 (1990); Al-
berta's Administrative Procedures and Jurisdiction Act, R.S.A., ch. A-3 (2000).
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Just as procedural review of administrative action incorporates
respect for the legislative and executive branches, substantive re-
view of these decisions is also deferential where required. As held
in the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision, Dunsmuir v. New
Brunswick,170 two standards of review may be applied to the deci-
sions of administrative bodies: correctness and reasonableness.
While the correctness standard invites the court to substitute its
own view if it does not agree with the decision-maker, 171 the rea-
sonableness standard is more deferential. When evaluating
whether a decision is reasonable, the court will look at whether
there is "justification, transparency and intelligibility within the
decision-making process"'172 and "whether the decision falls within
a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in
respect of the facts and law."'173
To determine the applicable degree of deference, the court will
consider factors including whether a privative clause exists that
precludes judicial review, the purpose of the administrative body
as determined by its enabling legislation, the nature of the ques-
tion at issue, and the body's expertise. 174 The presence of a priva-
tive clause is likely to result in application of the standard of rea-
sonableness; however, it cannot preclude judicial review, as the
review of administrative action is constitutionally protected. 175 If
the purpose of the administrative body or the nature of the ques-
tion at hand is more policy oriented, or requires the balancing of
different interests, this suggests that deference should be given to
the administrative decision-maker. 176 With respect to questions of
law, if the decision-maker is interpreting its enabling legislation,
the reasonableness standard is likely to be more appropriate.
However, questions of general law that are "both of central impor-
tance to the legal system as a whole and outside the adjudicator's
specialized area of expertise"' 77 or constitutional questions will





175. Dunsmuir, [20081 1 S.C.R. 190 46 (Can.); Proprio Direct Inc. v. Digeon, [2008] 2
S.C.R. 195 20 (Can.).
176. Dunsmuir, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 51 (Can.); Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982 36 (Can.); Pezim v. British Columbia
(Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557 (Can.).
177. Dunsmuir, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 60 (Can.) (citing Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local
79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77 (Can.)).
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tend to favour the application of the correctness standard.178 By
taking into account these factors, courts are able to limit their in-
trusion into the executive's role and to respect the intent of the
legislature in giving power to these administrative bodies while
still ensuring compliance with the constitutional principle of the
rule of law.
VII. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: THE ROLE OF THE DIFFERENT
BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT IN THE FACE OF MODERN GLOBAL
CHALLENGES
With the continuous trend toward globalization, the judicial
branch faces certain challenges that are inexorably linked to for-
eign and domestic policy, principles of international law, constitu-
tional questions, and judicial review of administrative action. In
the past decade, the Supreme Court of Canada, the Federal Court
of Appeal, and other Canadian courts have been asked to decide
questions related to national security and terrorism, 179 extradi-
tion, 80 and immigration and refugee law.' 8 ' These issues neces-
sarily involve the relationship among the three branches of Cana-
dian government and their appropriate roles.
The Supreme Court of Canada has indicated the importance of
international human rights law in both statutory interpretation
and the application of the Charter. In Baker, Canada's ratifica-
tion of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 8 2 supported the
majority's finding that immigration officers should consider the
best interests of any children affected when deciding whether a
foreign national should be able to stay in Canada on humanitarian
and compassionate grounds.18 3 In Suresh, the Court looked to in-
ternational law to determine whether it would be contrary to the
principles of fundamental justice (as referred to in section 7 of the
Charter) to deport a person to torture. 8 4 The Court stated:
178. Id. 58.
179. See, e.g., Khadr v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2008] 2 S.C.R. (Can.); Suresh v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.); In re
Charkaoui, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (Can.); In re Charkaoui, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 326 (Can.).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (Can.).
181. See, e.g., Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2
S.C.R. 817 (Can.); Oprysk v. Canada, [2008] F.C. 326 (Can.).
182. Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3.
183. Baker, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 69-71 (Can.).
184. Suresh, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 59-75 (Can.).
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International treaty norms are not, strictly speaking, binding
in Canada unless they have been incorporated into Canadian
law by enactment. However, in seeking the meaning of the
Canadian Constitution, the courts may be informed by inter-
national law. Our concern is not with Canada's international
obligations qua obligations; rather, our concern is with the
principles of fundamental justice. We look to international
law as evidence of these principles and not as controlling in
itself.18
5
The Court also examined international law in deciding whether
the extradition of an alleged murderer would infringe the ac-
cused's section 7 rights where there were no assurances that the
death penalty would not be sought in the receiving country.18 6
The Supreme Court of Canada has also acknowledged the need
to respect the role of the executive in deciding matters of foreign
and domestic policy. In reference to national security matters, the
Court cited the following passage by Lord Hoffmann in Secretary
of State for the Home Department v. Rehman:8 7
This seems to me to underline the need for the judicial arm of
government to respect the decisions of ministers of the Crown
on the question of whether support for terrorist activities in a
foreign country constitutes a threat to national security. It is
not only that the executive has access to special information
and expertise in these matters. It is also that such decisions,
with serious potential results for the community, require a le-
gitimacy which can be conferred only by entrusting them to
persons responsible to the community through the democratic
process. If the people are to accept the consequences of such
decisions, they must be made by persons whom the people
have elected and whom they can remove. 188
A similar caution was enunciated in Burns, in which the Court
noted that the executive was better placed to assess the various
interests involved in extradition and that, consequently, deference
is owed to the decision-maker.18 9
185. Id. 7 60.
186. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 77 79-93 (Can.).
187. [2001] 3 W.L.R. 877 T 62.
188. Suresh, [20021 1 S.C.R. 3 7 33 (Can.).
189. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 T 36 (Can.).
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Nevertheless, deference given to the executive must be tem-
pered with the constitutional duty of the courts to enforce the
Charter. While recognizing the challenges faced by the govern-
ment in maintaining national security, the Supreme Court has
held that section 7 of the Charter requires procedural fairness for
individuals who are detained on suspicion of being involved in ter-
rorist activity. 190 In Suresh, the Court discussed the balance that
is at play:
The issues engage concerns and values fundamental to Can-
ada and indeed the world. On the one hand stands the mani-
fest evil of terrorism and the random and arbitrary taking of
innocent lives, rippling out in an ever-widening spiral of loss
and fear. Governments, expressing the will of the governed,
need the legal tools to effectively meet this challenge.
On the other hand stands the need to ensure that those legal
tools do not undermine values that are fundamental to our
democratic society - liberty, the rule of law, and the princi-
ples of fundamental justice - values that lie at the heart of
the Canadian constitutional order and the international in-
struments that Canada has signed.191
In Burns, the Court held that, in the circumstances at bar, the
principles of fundamental justice did not justify the Minister's de-
cision to extradite the appellants without assurances that the
death penalty would not be sought. 192
VIII. CONCLUSION
While the Canadian government cannot be seen as an example
of the strict application of the separation of powers doctrine, Mon-
tesquieu's laudable goal of securing individual liberty is nonethe-
less sought in Canada. The relationship of the three branches of
government-the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary-is
characterized by checks and balances that promote the rule of law.
Furthermore, as Canada's system of government is one of consti-
tutional supremacy, individual and collective rights and freedoms
are protected against unjustified governmental infringement.
Through its role as a guardian of the Constitution, the judicial
190. In re Charkaoui, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 28 & 68 (Can.).
191. Suresh, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 3-4 (Can.).
192. United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 132 (Can.).
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branch of government can continue to ensure that Canada re-
mains a society committed to the rule of law and individual lib-
erty.
